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Abstract
Only legal facts should affect the application of the death penalty. This maxim is manifested
in the U.S. constitution and stipulated by the Supreme Court. With regard to extra−legal
economic factors, it has been applied to practice from 1950 to 1990 with the exception of two
states: For Louisiana and Utah a significant countercyclical enforcement is found. A marginal
increase of the economic conditions in these two states significantly reduces the probability
of the performance of executions in a certain year.
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When prisoners on death row in the U.S. have exhausted all their appeals, their
only chance of survival rests on having their death sentences commuted. If justice
in such cases is truly fair, then only the facts of the crime should aﬀect an inmate’s
chances of receiving clemency.1 Following this argumentation, we would expect no
systematic relationship between the number of performed executions and economic
activity across states over time, i.e. pre- and post-Furman.2 In contrast to studies on
gubernatorial election cycles and the timing of executions like Pridemore (2000) and
Kubik and Moran (2003), the present note isolates and examines this hypothesis. A
timing of executions independent from any budgetary politics (cf. Poterba, 1994)3
implies no signiﬁcant relationship between the cyclical component of real p.c. state
income and the annual number of performed executions. The task of the present
study is to scrutinize this relationship for the 39 states that imposed and enforced
the death penalty during the 1950-90 period.
2. Data and Methodology
For the 1950-90 period the number of performed executions per state and year is
compiled from the ESPY ﬁle provided by DPIC (2003). To capture the transitory
economic conditions of a state in a certain year the business cycle component of
personal disposable real income (p.c.) for each of the 39 states is chosen. In the
context of quantifying the role of gubernatorial election year politics in the decision
to execute, similar series are used as regressors; see Pridemore (2000) and Kubik and
1However, a recent strand of applied literature raises concerns about a disparate treatment of
defendants based on racial, political, and other extra-legal factors; see Langbein (1999), Pridemore
(2000), and Kubik and Moran (2003).
2In Furman v. Georgia, 1972, all executions were halted and hundreds of inmates had their death
sentences lifted by a Supreme Court decision. By 1976 the Court ruled that states could again impose
the death penalty provided that its application was neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.
3Figures of direct and indirect costs of crime are given in Levitt (1997) and NASBO (2003).
1Moran (2003).4 The state income series are taken from the BEA Regional Economic
Accounts. As is common practice, the national CPI taken from the IMF International
Financial Statistics has been used to deﬂate them (base year: 1990). Contrary to
existing studies, the assessment of the relationship between executions and transitory
economic conditions follows the methodology of applied business cycle research that
has been established since the seminal study by Kydland and Prescott (1990). The
cornerstones of this descriptive approach are (i) HP ﬁltering to extract business cycle
components (see Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) along with (ii) a comprehensive corre-
lation analysis, investigating the lead-lag relationships of the series at stake. With
regard to (i), an HP ﬁlter with a smoothing weight λ =6 .25, as recently suggested
for series of annual frequency by Ravn and Uhlig (2003), is used to extract the state
business cycle components (SBC) from the raw series.
3. Findings
3.1 Correlation Analysis. In 95% of all reported correlations of executions (EXC)
and SBC the respective coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant (Tab. 1). However, for LA, UT,
and WA a signiﬁcant countercyclical relationship is found.5 The strongest correlation
in terms of magnitude and signiﬁcance is found for LA. UT and WA show only a
weakly signiﬁcant contemporaneous correlation of EXC and SBC. For LA and UT
a signiﬁcant correlation is also found at ﬁrst as well as second lead and at ﬁrst lag,
respectively. Furthermore, LA and UT diﬀer from the case of WA, in so far as in the
state of WA EXC were performed up to 1964 only, while in LA and UT the application
of the death penalty continued in the post-Furman p e r i o d .U pt o1 9 6 4( pre-Furman),
however, the contemporaneous correlation coeﬃcient for WA is signiﬁcant, negative
and equals 64.13%. For UT the contemporaneous correlation for the subperiods 1950-
71 and 1976-90 is insigniﬁcant. Nevertheless, its correlation coeﬃcient for the ﬁrst
lag in the SBC series remains high in magnitude and signiﬁcance terms equalling
4Similarly, these authors consider idiosyncratic trend and cycle components across states. How-
ever, the following analysis abstracts from seeking to explain data of events on the sentencing stage
or the duration on death row before the transition to either a commutation or an execution. The
latter seem to be of more relevance in the context of election cycles.
5The weakly signiﬁcant scattered correlation coeﬃcients for IL and IN (NV and NC) at ﬁrst and
second lag (lead) of the respective SBC seem to be a product of chance rather than a robust result.
20.624∗ for 1950-71 and 0.300∗∗∗ for 1976-90, respectively. The same holds for LA
and its contemporaneous correlation of EXC and SBC equalling −0.527∗ for 1950-71
and −0.281∗∗ for 1976-90. The correlation analysis revealed that for the 39 U.S.
states that enforced the death penalty from 1950 to 1990 the respective SBC is not
associated with the timing of EXC apart from two notable exceptions: LA and UT.
3.2 The Case of Louisiana and Utah. This section raises the question whether
and by how much a marginal increase of the transitory state-wide economic conditions
(as measured by the SBC) reduces the probability of the performance of one or more
executions in the states of LA and UT for a certain year. An answer can be given by
estimating a qualitative response model. For this purpose the respective EXC series
for LA and UT is transformed into a binary variable by encoding each observation ≥ 1
with a value of 1. The time series of the two states are pooled and state speciﬁc ﬁxed-
eﬀects estimated: The resulting sample contains N = 82 pooled annual observations;
23 show a positive number of executions with 15 cases (i.e. 9 pre- and 6 post-Furman)
r e f e r r i n gt oL Aa n d8( i . e . 5pre- and 3 post-Furman)t oU T .T h es p e c i ﬁ c a t i o no f
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For the following estimates a cumulated normal distribution for F,i . e . aP r o bi t
model framework, is chosen.6
Marginal eﬀects are calculated, using the mean of the ﬁtted value of the index








Estimates of this model are reported in the ﬁrst row (S1) of Tab. 2. Normalized SBC
refers to the estimate for which the exogenous series was transformed to have a zero
6Results remain unchanged or change only marginally for a Logit speciﬁcation.
3mean and a standard deviation of one. All estimated eﬀects are signiﬁcant, at least,
at the 10% level of signiﬁcance. Accordingly, an increase of the SBC by1 0 0 0U S$( i n
prices of 1990) reduces the probability of one or more executions in a certain year by
about 4% in either of the two considered states - a one unit increase of the normalized
SBC by an even higher 10%. Speciﬁcation S2 considering the SBC series as a regressor
as well at its ﬁrst lag conﬁrms these ﬁgures.7 Additionally, it lends support to the
view that the enactment of EXC is following a peaking of the SBC with a lag of
one year. Astonishingly, a post-Furman dummy in neither speciﬁcation showed a
signiﬁcant impact on the probability of annual EXC-performances conditional on the
SBC series. In the case of LA and UT, this calls the compliance with the 1976
Supreme Court’s ruling in favor of a timing of executions across states solely based
on legal factors into question.
4. Conclusion
This study examined how the performance of executions in U.S. states relates and
responds to transitory changes in economic conditions as measured by the business
cycle component in real p.c. state income. The question raised in its title can not
unequivocally be answered with ‘no:’ For LA and UT, a signiﬁcant countercyclical
enforcement is revealed. Probit model estimates imply that a marginal increase of
the transitory economic conditions in these two states reduces the probability of the
enactment of one or more executions in a certain year by 3.5-10%. However, as
warned by Ehrlich and Brower (1987), these ﬁndings remain empirical associations
in the context of social sciences and should be interpreted with the adequate caution.
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7Although, the negative marginal eﬀect of a one thousand $ increase in SBC slightly diminishes
to 3.4%.
4Tab. 1. Correlation analysis: Executions and state business cycle components









































































































































































































5Tab. 1 (continued). Correlation analysis: Executions and state business cycles
State: EXCt → SBCt SBCt−1 SBCt−2 SBCt+1 SBCt+2






























































































































































































Note: *, **, *** denotes signiﬁcance at 10, 5, 1% level ofsigniﬁcance;
Newey-West HAC standard errors given in parentheses.
6Tab. 2. Two-state pooled Probit model estimation: Dependent is EXC (binary)




Non-normalized SBC Normalized SBC
SBC t: − 0.039* SBCt: − 0.100*
S2 LA: −0.405***
UT: −0.957***
Non-normalized SBC Normalized SBC
SBC t: − 0.034* SBCt: − 0.103*
SBCt−1: 0.032** SBCt−1: 0.095**
Fit S1 S2
McFadden R2 0.066 0.115
log L −45.4 −41.9
LR statistic 6.458 10.90
Note: *, **, *** denote eﬀects corresponding to coeﬃcient estimates signiﬁcant at the
10, 5, 1% level ofsigniﬁcance, according to standard errors based on GLM
robust covariances.
For S2 the lag length is chosen on the base ofthe Schwarz Criterion.
The non-normalized SBC-series are given in thousands ofUS 1990 $.
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